Gary Osweiler, DVM, PhD
Walter G. Hyde, BS, PhD
Department of Veterinary Diagnostic and Production Animal Medicine
College of Veterinary Medicine
Iowa State University
Ames, IA 50011

Current Threat and Challenges
Veterinary medicine has a large and vital role to play in potential bioterrorism involving zoonotic diseases or foreign animal diseases. Many animal pathogens may be transmitted to man and have been used in the past as potential biological warfare agents. Recent examples include Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), which has been developed by several countries as a potential biological warfare agent against humans. This direct threat of animal pathogens transmitted to man (zoonoses) is a concern for potential terrorist activities and necessarily involves the veterinary profession as part of a defense team. Foreign animal disease that could run rampant in unprotected livestock herds could be a form of economic terrorism. Recent experiences of several countries with outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Disease in cattle or swine and classical swine fever in intensive swine rearing areas highlight the economic devastation that can result from introduction of such agents. In addition, the E. coli O157: H7 organism is recognized as a potent debilitating and potentially deadly toxin-producing bacterium that could be incorporated in food supplies.

Many of the agents of presumed interest to bioterrorists can be accessed readily and/or produced with modest cost and technology. In addition, they would be difficult to detect if entering the country in secret, and could be widely distributed undetected until they are manifest as a livestock or human disease. Thus, clever placement of the agent is susceptible areas could start widespread and rapid dispersal before the initial diagnosis is confirmed. This is especially troublesome if the disease does not present initial distinctive signs or lesions and must be confirmed by a series of laboratory tests. While many of these potential biological and chemical agents are readily diagnosed by a combination of clinical and laboratory examination, recognition would be enhanced if there were laboratory access to sensitive and accurate testing procedures that are widely available, rapidly deployed, and well documented.

Optimal response to a potential or real bioterrorism outbreak depends, in part, on rapid access at the state and local level to information about what laboratories and authorities to contact, the stability of diagnostic/forensic samples under field condition, optimal samples to collect and interferences that might result in false positives or false negatives during testing. Thus, initial effective recognition of a threat of agricultural bioterrorism includes well-informed livestock producers and attending veterinarians, supported by rapid and definitive diagnostic services and the ability to readily access important and reliable information.

Existing Resources to Meet the Challenge
Federal laboratory services and a nation wide system of federal area veterinarians, the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) manages the detection and containment of foreign animal diseases and those diseases targeted for eradication in the USA. First responders such as veterinarians and diagnostic laboratories report suspected foreign animal diseases (FAD) to federal authorities. Many times, the suspect FAD reaches a state diagnostic laboratory before a level of suspicion for FAD is raised. In the case of an outbreak, first responders such as well-informed local veterinarians and state diagnostic laboratories are a key factor in prompt recognition of differential diagnoses that include FAD, as well as subsequent notification of federal authorities. If the outbreak were massive, or staged on multiple fronts (as in agricultural bioterrorism), the cooperative additional resources of state diagnostic laboratories assisting APHIS could be invaluable in meeting a large scale problem. State laboratories are dispersed nationwide so that one or more would be geographically close to any potential problem. In addition, state or regional laboratories are familiar with local or regional problems and thus an important adjunct for differential diagnosis. In many cases, individual laboratories or their staff are recognized resources for a specific disease problem. This expertise is particularly important where the threat is not FAD, but one of many potential recognized bioterrorism agents (e.g. Anthrax, Brucellosis, Q-fever, Plague, Tularemia, Equine encephalomyelitis). For large scale or rapidly moving outbreaks, federal authorities could call on local laboratories for animal disease assistance, especially for those where local expertise is recognized and the problem is determined not to be a foreign animal disease. However, state laboratories are only casually associated with one another, and their methodologies often vary with respect to sensitivity, specificity and speed of completion.

At the present time, local veterinarians may first call state regulatory veterinarians or their state diagnostic laboratories if they encounter a suspicious loss of animals. If state assistance was not adequate, or if a foreign animal disease is suspected, the state laboratory can enlist the help of the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL). If forensic or defense authorities are involved, the process could probably be expedited. Federal field and/or laboratory personnel can be sent on-site to collect samples and run appropriate tests. This chain of command and travel time results in some delay, and a widespread outbreak across the nation could overload centrally located laboratories. The current system has many excellent features, and may be augmented by evolving and increasing cooperation and interaction with state/regional laboratories that have appropriate credentials and level of performance for specific diseases. Currently neither federal nor state laboratories have comprehensive, reliable and organized information about what is available at local laboratories and how well they perform on critical tests. In addition, there is no standardized listing of tests offered. Often laboratories offer testing that is aligned with their local or regional needs.

Augmenting Resources to Meet the Challenge
To answer the need for more comprehensive state-federal interactions, a nationwide group of laboratories representing regional/geographic dispersion is being organized for better communication and eventual standardized acceptable performance for specific diagnostic tests. In addition, the cooperating groups are developing an electronic interlaboratory/interagency communications vehicle to provide awareness of individual laboratory testing capabilities as well as access to recognized experts in various diseases. Finally, there is specific effort to develop training and continuing education vehicles to keep first responders (practicing veterinarians, diagnostic laboratories, students) aware of and knowledgeable about disease diagnosis and appropriate response to specific foreign or domestic animal diseases. Iowa State University, University of Georgia and University of California – Davis are collaborating in developing educational programs. Iowa State University and Louisiana State University are developing a nationwide network of state veterinary diagnostic laboratories working in concert with USDA APHIS with input from other federal agencies, including Department of Justice, Department of Energy and the Centers for Disease Control.

The effort involved is to create a communication system among appropriate agencies and laboratories, followed by collection of as much information as possible on the type of testing available, the specific methodologies, documentation of quality control, precision, sensitivity and specificity. Since no responsible federal, local or private authority has this information, the challenge will be to collect, document, organize and present the information on what is presently available, what appears to be done well, and where there are gaps in testing or interpretive information. In addition, there should be an assessment of rapid response capabilities at these state laboratories. Often, laboratory data alone is insufficient to complete a diagnostic or forensic evaluation. There is need for on-site examination of animals and the environment to put laboratory results in context. However, such field examination should be done according to prescribed approaches at both the state and federal level.

An organized and cooperating group can develop a system of research, collaborative studies and check-sample testing to assure quality and dependability. After that, there would be continual communication, reassessment and support to maintain a responsive system that is hopefully never or rarely used. This will require a disciplined evaluation with simulated exercises to keep the system in working condition. The entire concept is similar to a military or fire protection mentality, with continual vigilance and attention to rapid response while seeking even better methods to provide rapid and accurate evaluation.